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Abstract
Secure compilation prevents all low-level attacks on compiled code and al-
lows for sound reasoning about security in the source language. In this
work we propose a new attacker model for secure compilation that extends
the well-known notion of full abstraction to ensure protection for mutu-
ally distrustful components. We devise a compiler chain (compiler, linker,
and loader) and a novel security monitor that together defend against this
strong attacker model. The monitor is implemented using a recently pro-
posed, generic tag-based protection framework called micro-policies, which
comes with hardware support for efficient caching and with a formal ver-
ification methodology. Our monitor protects the abstractions of a simple
object-oriented language—class isolation, the method call discipline, and
type safety—against arbitrary low-level attackers.
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1 Introduction
1.1 General Context
In this work we study compiled partial programs
evolving within a low-level environment, with which
they can interact. Such interaction is useful — think
of high-level programs performing low-level library
calls, or of a browser interacting with native code that
was sent over the internet [12,45] — but also danger-
ous: parts of the environment could be malicious or
compromised and try to compromise the program as
well [12, 15, 45]. Low-level libraries written in C or
in C++ can be vulnerable to control hijacking at-
tacks [15,41] and be taken over by a remote attacker.
When the environment can’t be trusted, it is a major
concern to ensure the security of running programs.
With today’s compilers, low-level attackers [15] can
circumvent high-level abstractions [1,25] and are thus
much more powerful than high-level attackers, which
means that the security reasoning has to be done at
the lowest level, which it is extremely difficult. An
alternative is to build a secure compiler that ensures
that low- and high-level attackers have exactly the
same power, allowing for easier, source-level security
reasoning [4, 19, 22, 32]. Formally, the notion of se-
cure compilation is usually expressed as full abstrac-
tion of the translation [1]. Full abstraction is a much
stronger property than just compiler correctness [27].
Secure compilation is, however, very hard to
achieve in practice. Efficiency, which is crucial for
broad adoption [41], is the main challenge. Another
concern is transparency. While we want to constrain
the power of low-level attackers, the constraints we
set should be relaxed enough that there is a way for
all benign low-level environments to respect them. If
we are not transparent enough, the partial program
might be prevented from properly interacting with its
environment (e.g. the low-level libraries it requires).
For a compiler targeting machine code, which lacks
structure and checks, a typical low-level attacker has
write access to the whole memory, and can redirect
control flow to any location in memory [15]. Tech-
niques have been developed to deal with such pow-
erful attackers, in particular involving randomiza-
tion [4] and binary code rewriting [16, 29]. The first
ones only offer weak probabilistic guarantees; as a
consequence, address space layout randomization [4]
is routinely circumvented in practical attacks [17,37].
The second ones add extra software checks which of-
ten come at a high performance cost.
Using additional protection in the hardware can re-
sult in secure compilers with strong guarantees [32],
without sacrificing efficiency or transparency. Be-
cause updating hardware is expensive and hardware
adoption takes decades, the need for generic protec-
tion mechanisms that can fit with ever-evolving secu-
rity requirements has emerged. Active research in the
domain includes capability machines [11, 42, 43] and
tag-based architectures [8, 9, 14, 39]. In this work, we
use a generic tag-based protection mechanism called
micro-policies [9, 14] as the target of a secure com-
piler.
Micro-policies provide instruction-level monitoring
based on fine-grained metadata tags. In a micro-
policy machine, every word of data is augmented with
a word-sized tag, and a hardware-accelerated monitor
propagates these tags every time a machine instruc-
tion gets executed. Micro-policies can be described
as a combination of software-defined rules and mon-
itor services. The rules define how the monitor will
perform tag propagation instruction-wise, while the
services allow for direct interaction between the run-
ning code and the monitor. This mechanism comes
with an efficient hardware implementation built on
top of a RISC processor [14] as well as a mechanized
metatheory [9], and has already been used to enforce
a variety of security policies [9, 14].
1.2 Research Problem
Recent work [6, 32] has illustrated how protected
module architectures — a class of hardware archi-
tectures featuring coarse-grained isolation mecha-
nisms [20, 28, 38] — can help in devising a fully ab-
stract compilation scheme for a Java-like language.
This scheme assumes the compiler knows which com-
ponents in the program can be trusted and which ones
cannot, and protects the trusted components from
the distrusted ones by isolating them in a protected
module.
This kind of protection is only appropriate when all
the components we want to protect can be trusted,
for example because they have been verified [5]. Ac-
counting for the cases in which this is not possible,
we present and adopt a stronger attacker model of
mutual distrust : in this setting a secure compiler
should protect each component from every other com-
ponent, so that whatever the compromise scenario
may be, uncompromised components always get pro-
tected from the compromised ones.
The main questions we address in this work are:
(1) can we build a fully abstract compiler to a micro-
policy machine? and (2) can we support a stronger
attacker model by protecting mutually distrustful
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components against each other?
We are the first to work on question 1, and among
the first to study question 2: Micro-policies are a re-
cent hardware mechanism [9, 14] that is flexible and
fine-grained enough to allow building a secure com-
piler against this strong attacker model. In indepen-
dent parallel work [31,34], Patrignani et al. are trying
to extend their previous results [32] to answer ques-
tion 2 using different mechanisms (e.g. multiple pro-
tected modules and randomization). Related work is
further discussed in §7.
1.3 Our Contribution
In this work we propose a new attacker model for
secure compilation that extends the well-known no-
tion of full abstraction to ensure protection for mutu-
ally distrustful components (§2). We devise a secure
compilation solution (§4) for a simple object-oriented
language (§5.1) that defends against this strong at-
tacker model. Our solution includes a simple compiler
chain (compiler, linker, and loader; §6.1) and a novel
micro-policy (§6.2) that protects the abstractions of
our simple language—class isolation, the method call
discipline, and type safety—against arbitrary low-
level attackers. Enforcing a method call discipline
and type safety using a micro-policy is novel and con-
stitutes a contribution of independent interest.
We have started proving that our compiler is se-
cure, but since that proof is not yet finished, we do
not present it in the report. Section 8.2 explains
why we have good hopes in the efficiency and trans-
parency of our solution for the protection of realistic
programs. We also discuss ideas for mitigation when
our mechanism is not transparent enough. However,
in both cases gathering evidence through experiments
to confirm our hopes is left for future work.
1.4 Other Insights
Throughout this work, we reasoned a lot about ab-
stractions. One insight we gained is that even very
simple high-level languages are much more abstract
than one would naively expect. Moreover, we learned
that some abstractions — such as functional purity
— are impossible to efficiently enforce dynamically.
We also needed to extend the current hardware and
formalism of micro-policies (§5.3) in order to achieve
our challenging security goal. We needed two kinds
of extensions: some only ease micro-policy writing,
while the others increase the power to the monitoring
mechanism. The first ones require a policy compiler,
allowing an easier specification for complex micro-
policies, which can then still run on the current hard-
ware. The second ones require actual hardware ex-
tensions. Both of these extensions keep the spirit of
micro-policies unchanged: Rules, in particular, are
still specified as a mapping from tags to tags.
Finally, as we mention in §6.1.2, we were able to
provide almost all security at the micro-policy level
rather than the compiler level. This is very encourag-
ing because it means that we might be able to provide
full abstraction for complex compilers that already
exist, using micro-policies while providing very little
change to the compiler itself.
2 Stronger Attacker Model for Se-
cure Compilation of Mutually
Distrustful Components
Previous work on secure compilation [4,19,22,32] tar-
gets a property called full abstraction [1]. This sec-
tion presents full abstraction (§2.1), motivates why
it is not enough in the context of mutually distrust-
ful components (§2.2), and introduces a stronger at-
tacker model for this purpose (§2.3).
2.1 Full Abstraction
Full abstraction is a property of compilers that talks
about the observable behaviors of partial programs
evolving in a context. When we use full abstraction
for security purposes, we will think of contexts as at-
tackers trying to learn the partial program’s secrets,
or to break its internal invariants. Full abstraction
relates the observational power of low-level contexts
to that of high-level contexts. Hence, when a com-
piler achieves full abstraction, low-level attackers can
be modeled as high-level ones, which makes reason-
ing about the security of programs much easier: Be-
cause they are built using source-level abstractions,
high-level attackers have more structure and their in-
teraction with the program is limited to that allowed
by the semantics of the source language.
In order to state full abstraction formally, one first
has to provide definitions for partial programs, con-
texts, and observable behaviors both in the high-
and the low-level. Partial programs are similar to
usual programs; but they could still be missing some
elements—e.g. external libraries—before they can be
executed. The usual, complete programs can be seen
as a particular case of partial programs which have no
missing elements, and are thus ready for execution.
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A context is usually defined as a partial program with
a hole; this hole can later be filled with a partial pro-
gram in order to yield a new partial program. Finally,
observable behaviors of complete programs can vary
depending on the language and may include, termi-
nation, I/O during execution, final result value, or
final memory state.
The chosen definition for contexts will set the gran-
ularity at which the attacker can operate. Similarly,
defining the observable behaviors of complete pro-
grams can affect the observational power of the at-
tacker in our formal model. The attacker we want to
protect the program against is the context itself: The
definition we choose for observable behaviors should
allow the context to produce an observable action ev-
ery time it has control, thus letting it convert its
knowledge into observable behaviors. In our case,
our source and target languages feature immediate
program termination constructs. We can thus choose
program termination as an observable behavior which
models such strong observational power.
We denote high-level partial programs by P ,Q ,
and high-level contexts by A. We denote by A[P ]
the partial program obtained by inserting a high-level
partial program P in a high-level context A. We de-
note low-level partial programs by p, q , and high-level
contexts by a. We denote by a[p] the insertion of a
low-level partial program p in a low-level context a.
Given a high-level partial program P , we denote by
P↓ the low-level program obtained by compiling P .
We denote the fact that two complete high-level pro-
grams P and Q have the same observable behavior by
P ∼H Q . For two complete low-level programs p and
q , we denote this by p ∼L q . With these notations,
full abstraction of the compiler is stated as
(∀A,A[P ] ∼H A[Q ]) ⇐⇒ (∀ a, a[P↓] ∼L a[Q↓])
for all P and Q . Put into words, a compiler is fully
abstract when any two high-level partial programs P
and Q behave the same in every high-level context
if and only if the compiled partial programs P↓ and
Q ↓ behave the same in every low-level context. In
other words, a compiler is fully abstract when a low-
level attacker is able to distinguish between exactly
the same programs as a high-level attacker.
Intuitively, in the definition of full abstraction the
trusted compiled program (P ↓ or Q ↓) is protected
from the untrusted low-level context (a) in a way that
the context cannot cause more harm to the program
than a high-level context (A) already could. This
static separation between the trusted compiled pro-
gram and the context is in practice chosen by the user
and communicated to the compiler chain, which can
insert a single protection barrier between between the
two. In particular, in the definition of full abstraction
the compiler is only ever invoked for the protected
program (P↓ or Q↓), and can use this fact to its ad-
vantage, e.g. to add dynamic checks. Moreover, the
definition of a[p] (low-level linking) can insert a dy-
namic protection barrier between the trusted p and
the untrusted a. For instance, Patrignani et al. [32]
built a fully abstract compilation scheme targeting
protected module architectures by putting the com-
piled program into a protected part of the memory
(the protected module) and giving only unprotected
memory to the context. A single dynamic protection
barrier is actually enough to enforce the full abstrac-
tion attacker model.
2.2 Limitations of Full Abstraction
We study languages for which programs can be de-
composed into components. Real-world languages
have good candidates for such a notion of compo-
nents: depending on the granularity we target, they
could be packages, modules, or classes. Our compiler
is such that source components are separately com-
pilable program units, and compilation maps source-
level components to target-level components.
When using a fully abstract compiler in the pres-
ence of multiple components, the user has a choice
whether a component written in the high-level lan-
guage is trusted, in which case it is considered part
of the program, or untrusted, in which case it is con-
sidered part of the context. If it is untrusted, the
component can as well be compiled with an insecure
compiler, since anyway the fully abstract compiler
only provides security to components that are on the
good side of the protection barrier. If the program in-
cludes components written in the low-level language,
e.g. for efficiency reasons, then the user has gener-
ally no choice but to consider these components un-
trusted. Because of the way full abstraction is stated,
low-level components that are not the result of the
compiler cannot be part of the trusted high-level pro-
gram, unless they have at least a high-level equivalent
(we discuss this idea in §2.3).
Figure 1 graphically illustrates how full abstraction
could be applied in a multi-component setting. Com-
ponents C1, C2, and C3 are written in the high-level
language, while c4 and c5 are written in the low-level
one. Suppose the user chooses to trust C1 and C2
and not to trust C3, then the compiler will introduce
a single barrier protecting C1 and C2 from all the
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C1 C2 C3 c4 c5
fully abstract
compilation
C1↓ C2↓ C3↓opt c4 c5
C1↓ C2↓ a a a
optimizing
compilation
attack
trusted distrusted
user chosen separation
Figure 1: Full abstraction for multiple components
other components.
There are two assumptions on the attacker model
when we take full abstraction as a characterization
of secure compilation: the user correctly identifies
trusted and untrusted components so that (1) trusted
components need not be protected from each other,
and (2) untrusted components need no protection
whatsoever. We argue that there are common cases
in which the absolute, binary trust notion implied by
full abstraction is too limiting (e.g. there is no way to
achieve all the user’s security goals), and for which a
stronger attacker model protecting mutually distrust-
ful components is needed.
Assumption (1) is only realistic if all trusted com-
ponents are memory safe [13] and do not exhibit C-
style undefined behaviors. Only when all trusted
components have a well-defined semantics in the
high-level language is a fully abstract compiler re-
quired to preserve this semantics at the low level.
Memory safety for the trusted components may fol-
low either from the fact that the high-level language
is memory safe as a whole or that the components
have been verified to be memory safe [5]. In the typi-
cal case of unverified C code, however, assumption (1)
can be unrealistically strong, and the user cannot be
realistically expected to decide which components are
memory safe. If he makes the wrong choice all bets
are off for security, a fully abstract compiler can pro-
duce code in which a control hijacking attack [15,41]
in one trusted component can take over all the rest.
While we are not aware of any fully abstract compiler
for unverified C, we argue that if one focuses solely on
achieving the full abstraction property, such a com-
piler could potentially be as insecure in practice as
standard compilers.
Even in cases where assumption (1) is acceptable,
assumption (2) is still a very strong one. In partic-
ular, since components written in the low-level lan-
guage cannot get protection, every security-critical
component would have to be written in the high-level
C1 C2 C3 c4 c5
C1↓ C2↓ C3↓ c4 c5
a
 ∀ attack
C3↓ c5aC1↓
secure
compilation
C5↓
~
Figure 2: Secure compilation for mutually distrustful
components
source language, which is often not realistic. Com-
piler correctness would be sufficient on its own if all
components could be written in a safe high-level lan-
guage. The point in moving from compiler correct-
ness to full abstraction, which is stronger, is precisely
to account for the fact that some components have
to be written in the low-level language, e.g. for per-
formance reasons.
Assumption (2) breaks as soon as we consider that
it makes a difference whether the attacker owns one
or all the untrusted components. As an example, as-
sume that an attacker succeeds in taking over an un-
trusted component that was used by the program to
render the picture of a cat. Would one care whether
this allows the attacker to also take over the low-level
cryptographic library that manages private keys? We
believe that the cryptographic library, which is a
security-critical component, should get the same level
of protection as a compiled component, even if for ef-
ficiency it is implemented in the low-level language.
When assumption (1) breaks, trusted components
need to be protected from each other, or at least from
the potentially memory unsafe ones. When assump-
tion (2) breaks, untrusted security-critical compo-
nents need to be protected from the other untrusted
components. In this work, we propose a stronger at-
tacker model that removes both these assumptions by
requiring all components to be protected from each
other.
2.3 Mutual Distrust Attacker Model
We propose a new attacker model that overcomes the
previously highlighted limitations of full abstraction.
In this attacker model, we assume that each compo-
nent could be compromised and protect all the other
components from it: we call it an attacker model for
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mutually distrustful components. This model can pro-
vide security even in C-like unsafe languages when
some of the high-level components are memory un-
safe or have undefined behaviors. This is possible if
the high-level semantics treats undefined behavior as
arbitrary changes in the state of the component that
triggered it, rather than in the global state of the pro-
gram. In the following we will assume the high-level
language is secure.
All compiled high-level components get security
unconditionally: the secure compiler and the dy-
namic barriers protect them from all low-level at-
tacks, which allows reasoning about their security in
the high-level language. For low-level components to
get security they have to satisfy additional conditions,
since the protection barriers are often not enough on
their own for security, as the compiler might be in-
serting boundary checks, cleaning registers, etc. and
the low-level code still needs to do these things on
its own in order to get full protection. Slightly more
formally, in order for a low-level component c to get
security it must behave in all low-level contexts like
some compiled high-level component C↓. In this case
we can reason about its security at the high level by
modelling it asC. This captures the scenario in which
c is written in the low-level language for efficiency
reasons.
We illustrate our stronger attacker model in fig-
ure 2. The protected program is the same as in the
previous full abstraction diagram of figure 1. This
time, however, the user doesn’t choose a trust bar-
rier: all components are considered mutually distrust-
ful instead. Each of them gets protected from the
others thanks to barriers inserted by the compiler.
While components C3, c4, and c5 were distrusted
and thus not protected in the previous diagram, here
all of them can get the same amount of protection
as other components. To get security C3 is com-
piled using the secure compiler, while for c4 and c5
security is conditioned on equivalence to high-level
components; in the figure we assume this only for c5.
The attacker can compromise arbitrary components
(including high-level compiled components), e.g. C2↓
and c4 in the diagram. In this compromise scenario,
we ensure that the uncompromised components C1↓,
C3↓, and c5 are protected from all low-level attacks
coming from the compromised components. In gen-
eral, our attacker model defends against all such com-
promise scenarios.
To sum up, our attacker model can be stated as fol-
lows: (a) the attacker compromises with component
granularity, (b) the attacker may compromise any
set of components, (c) in every compromise scenario,
each uncompromised compiled high-level component
is secure against low-level attacks from all compro-
mised components, and (d) in every compromise sce-
nario, each uncompromised low-level component that
has a high-level equivalent is secure against low-level
attacks from all compromised components.
3 Micro-Policies and the PUMP:
Efficient Tag-Based Security
Monitors
We present micro-policies [9, 14], the mechanism we
use to monitor low-level code so as to enforce that
our compiler is secure. Micro-policies [9, 14] are
a tag-based dynamic protection mechanism for ma-
chine code. The reference implementation on which
micro-policies are based is called the PUMP [14] (Pro-
grammable Unit for Metadata Processing).
The PUMP architecture associates each piece of
data in the system with a metadata tag describing its
provenance or purpose (e.g. “this is an instruction,”
“this came from the network,” “this is secret,” “this is
sealed with key k”), propagates this metadata as in-
structions are executed, and checks that policy rules
are obeyed throughout the computation. It provides
great flexibility for defining policies and puts no ar-
bitrary limitations on the size of the metadata or the
number of policies supported. Hardware simulations
show [14] that an Alpha processor extended with
PUMP hardware achieves performance comparable
to dedicated hardware on a standard benchmark suite
when enforcing either memory safety, control-flow in-
tegrity, taint tracking, or code and data separation.
When enforcing these four policies simultaneously,
monitoring imposes modest impact on runtime (typ-
ically under 10%) and power ceiling (less than 10%),
in return for some increase in energy usage (typically
under 60%) and chip area (110%).
The reference paper on micro-policies [9] gener-
alizes previously used methodology [8] to provide a
generic framework for formalizing and verifying ar-
bitrary policies enforceable by the PUMP architec-
ture. In particular, it defines a generic symbolic ma-
chine, which abstracts away from low-level hardware
details and serves as an intermediate step in correct-
ness proofs. This machine is parameterized by a sym-
bolic micro-policy, provided by the micro-policy de-
signer, that expresses tag propagation and checking
in terms of structured mathematical objects rather
than bit-level concrete representations. The micro-
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policies paper also defines a concrete machine which
is a model of PUMP-like hardware, this time includ-
ing implementation details.
The proposed approach to micro-policy design and
verification is presented as follows. First, one de-
signs a reference abstract machine, which will serve
as a micro-policy specification. Then, one instanti-
ates the generic symbolic machine with a symbolic
micro-policy and proves that the resulting symbolic
machine refines the abstract machine: the observable
behaviors of the symbolic machine are also legal be-
haviors of the abstract machine, and in particular the
symbolic machine fail-stops whenever the abstract
machine does. Finally, the symbolic micro-policy is
implemented in low-level terms, and one proves that
the concrete machine running the micro-policy imple-
mentation refines the symbolic machine.
In this work, we use a slightly modified symbolic
machine as the target of our secure compiler. Our
symbolic machine differs from the previous one [9] in
two ways: First, its memory is separated into regions,
which are addressed by symbolic pointers. Note, how-
ever, that our protection does not rely on this sepa-
ration but only on the tagging mechanism itself: in
particular, all components can refer to all symbolic
pointers, without restriction. Mapping memory re-
gions to concrete memory locations before executing
the program on a concrete machine would be a main
task of a loader — we leave a complete formalization
of loading for future work. Second, we extend the
micro-policy mechanism itself, allowing rules to read
and write the tags on more components of the ma-
chine state. We detail these extensions in section 5.3,
which is dedicated to our target machine. We also
leave for future work the implementation of these ad-
ditional tags in the PUMP rules, their formalization
in an extended concrete machine, and the extension
of our results to the concrete level.
4 Compilation Chain Overview
In this section, we present our compiler and give in-
tuition about the connections between the different
parts that play a role in our solution.
Our compilation chain, which we present in fig-
ure 3, splits into a two-step compiler, a linker and
a loader. It produces a program to execute on the
symbolic micro-policy machine. Our dedicated pro-
tection micro-policy will be loaded into the machine,
allowing proper runtime monitoring of the program.
The compilation chain takes source components
(e.g. a main program and standard libraries) and tar-
compiler phase I
compiler phase II
linker
high-level
components
type
interfaces
low-level
components
type
interfaces
loader
symbolic micro-policy machine
complete program
protection
micro-policy
type interfaces
tagged complete program
result
Figure 3: Overview of the compilation chain
get components (e.g. low-level libraries) as input, and
outputs a target-executable program. Components
must all come with interface specifications, written
in a common interface language. These interfaces
specify the definitions that each component provides,
and the definitions it expects other components to
provide.
In the compilation phase, the compiler first trans-
lates source components to an intermediate represen-
tation, which then gets translated to target compo-
nents.
In the linking phase, the linker checks that the in-
terfaces of the components getting linked are com-
patible. It also makes sure that all components only
give definitions under names that follow from their
interfaces; and symmetrically that they do provide a
definition for each of these names. Is so, the linker
puts them together to form a partial program, and
makes sure that this partial program is actually com-
plete (i.e. no definition is missing).
In the loading phase, the loader builds an initial
machine state out of this complete program by tag-
ging its memory using type information that was
gathered by the linker. The result is thus a target-
level executable program — i.e. a symbolic machine
tagged program. The loader’s tagging will force
all components to correctly implement the interfaces
that was provided for them, when we later run and
monitor them using our protection micro-policy: The
machine will failstop as soon as a component violates
its interface upon interaction with another compo-
nent (violations on internal computational steps is
not harmful and hence allowed).
Because we required that every component should
have an interface, low-level libraries that were com-
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piled using other compilers — e.g. C compilers — are
only usable in our system if somebody writes inter-
faces for them. In section 8 we discuss more generally
the need for manual or automated wrapping of low-
level code; once we have a way to wrap low-level code,
providing a matching interface will be easy.
5 Languages and Machines
In this section, we present and formalize the lan-
guages that are used in the compilation scheme.
We introduce a simple object-oriented language, an
abstract stack machine, and an extended symbolic
micro-policy machine with segmented memory. The
first will be our source language and the last our
target machine, while the intermediate abstract ma-
chine will offer a different view from the source lan-
guage which makes the connection with the low level
more direct. The source language includes constructs
for specifying the interfaces of components; these get
reused as-is at all levels.
5.1 Source Level: An Object-Oriented
Language
We first formalize our source language, beginning
with the interface constructs that it offers and then
presenting its syntax and semantics. The source lan-
guage we consider is an imperative class-based object-
oriented language with static objects, private fields,
and public methods. It is inspired by previous for-
malizations of Java core calculi [10,21] and Java sub-
sets [23], with the aim of keeping things as simple as
possible. As a consequence, we do not handle inheri-
tance nor dynamic allocation, which are available in
all these works.
We start with the simplicity of Featherweight
Java [21], and add imperative features in the way
Middleweight Java [10] does. However, we do not add
as many imperative features: just branching, field
update and early termination (the latter is not a fea-
ture of Middleweight Java). The resulting language
is similar to Java Jr. [23] with early termination, but
without packages: Our granularity for components is
that of classes instead.
Example components which encode some usual
types are provided in appendix section A.1, and could
help in getting familiar with this language.
IDT ::= import declaration tables
DT
EDT ::= export declaration tables
DT
DT ::= declaration tables
(CDT ,ODT )
CDT ::= class declaration table
[] | {c 7→ CD} :: CDT
CD ::= class declaration
class decl {MD1, ... ,MDk}
MD ::= method declaration
cr(ca)
ODT ::= object declaration table
[] | {o 7→ OD} :: ODT
OD ::= object declaration
objdecl c
Figure 4: Interface language syntax
5.1.1 Interfacing: A Specification Language
for Communicating Classes
The notion of component in this work is that of a class
c together with all its object instances’ definitions.
Because we have no dynamic allocation, for the mo-
ment these instances are simply all the static objects
defined with type c. To allow interaction between
components while being able to separately compile
them, we have a simple interface syntax based on im-
port and export declarations. This interface language
gives the external view on source components and is
presented in figure 4.
Syntax and Naming Conventions Object
names o and class names c are global and assumed to
be arbitrary natural numbers. The two main syntac-
tic constructs in the interface language are class dec-
larations and static object declarations. Class dec-
larations specify public methods with argument and
result types without providing their body; no fields
are declared in an interface because we only consider
private fields in our languages. Static object declara-
tions specify an object to be an instance of a given
class, without providing the values of its fields.
The interface of a partial program at all levels is
composed of an import declaration table IDT speci-
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fying the class and object definitions it expects other
components to provide, and an export declaration ta-
ble EDT which declares the definitions that this par-
tial program provides. Export and import declara-
tion tables share common syntax and are composed
of class and object declarations. The type of the de-
clared objects must come from the classes specified
by the partial program: defining object instances of
classes coming from other components is not allowed.
Intuitively, our object constructors (and fields) are
private and the only way to interact with objects is
via method calls.
In contrast with objects and classes to which we
refer using global names, methods are class-wise in-
dexed: the methods m of a class c are referred to
as 1, . . . , k following the order of their declarations.
(The same goes for fields f , below.) The syntax we
consider for names can be thought of as coming out
of a parser, that would take a user-friendly Java-like
syntax and perform simple transformations so that
the names match our conventions.
Use at Linking and Loading We have presented
the roles of the linker and the loader when we in-
troduced the compilation chain in section 4: We can
model linking as an operation that takes two target
partial programs and their interfaces, and yields a
new partial program which contains all definitions
from both partial programs, with a new matching
interface. Loading then takes a complete target pro-
gram and tags it, yielding a machine state that can be
reduced using the semantics of our symbolic micro-
policy machine. Let us now explain how interfaces
are used at linking and loading.
A class import declaration gives the precise type
signatures that the partial program expects from the
methods of the corresponding class: When linking
against a partial program that defines this class, the
class export declaration should exactly match with
the import one. Similarly, an import object decla-
ration gives the expected type for this object, and
should match with the corresponding export decla-
ration when linking against a partial program that
defines it.
Two partial programs have compatible interfaces
when (1) they don’t both have export declarations
for the same class nor the same object, and (2) for
every name in an import declaration of any of the
two programs, if the other program happens to have
an export declaration for this name, then the im-
port and export declarations are syntactically equal.
Linking two partial programs with compatible in-
P, Q ::= source program
(IDT ,T ,EDT )
T ::= definition tables
(CT ,OT )
CT ::= class definition table
[] | {c 7→ C} :: CT
C ::= class definition
class {c1, ... , ck ;M1, ... ,Ml}
M ::= method definition
cr(ca){e}
e ::= expressions
this | arg | o | e.f | e.f := e ′ | e.m(e ′)
| e == e ′ ? e ′′ : e ′′′ | exit e | e; e ′
OT ::= object definition table
[] | {o 7→ O} :: OT
O ::=
obj c{o1, ... , ok}
Figure 5: Source language syntax
terfaces yields a new partial program with updated
import/export declarations: Export declarations are
combined, and import declarations that found match-
ing export declarations are removed. When all par-
tial programs have been linked together, the linker
can check that there are no remaining import decla-
rations to make sure that the program is complete.
Finally, the loader will make use of the export dec-
larations to ensure that programs comply with the ex-
port declarations they declared: In the untyped tar-
get language, the loader sets the initial memory tags
in accordance with the export declarations, which
will allow our micro-policy to perform dynamic type
checking. This will be further explained in section
6.2.3.
5.1.2 Source Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of our source language is presented in
figure 5. The two main syntactic constructs in this
language are class definitions and static object defi-
nitions. Class definitions declare typed private fields
and define public methods with argument and re-
sult types as well as an expression which serves as
a method body. Static object definitions define in-
stances of defined classes by providing well-typed val-
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ues for the fields. For simplicity, methods only take
one argument: this does not affect expressiveness be-
cause our language is expressive enough to encode tu-
ple types (appendix section A.1 shows examples that
encode more complex types than tuple types).
Most expressions are not surprising for an object-
oriented language: apart from static object refer-
ences o and variables (this for the current object
and arg for the method’s argument), we have sup-
port for selecting private fields, calling public meth-
ods, and testing object identities for equality. The
language also features field update and early termina-
tion. Both are crucial for modeling realistic low-level
attackers in our high-level language: Low-level at-
tackers can indeed keep information between calls us-
ing the memory and stop the machine whenever they
have control. We thus add primitives that can model
this in the high-level: field updates enable methods
to have state (methods are not pure functions any-
more), and early termination allows an attacker to
prematurely end the program.
Like we already mentioned, fields are private and
methods are public. This means that in the method
body of a given class, the only objects whose fields
may be accessed are the instances of that specific
class. The only way to interact with object instances
of other classes is to perform a method call.
The only values in the language are object names,
and the only types are class names. The language
comes with a type system that ensures that object
and method definitions match with the types that
were declared for them. Our language does not fea-
ture dynamic allocation, inheritance, or exceptions.
We hope to add some of these features in the future.
Loops are simulated using recursive method calls and
branching is done via object identity tests.
The semantics of the source language is standard
and is given in appendix A.2.
5.2 Intermediate Level: An Object-
Oriented Stack Machine
Our intermediate machine is an object-oriented stack
machine with one local stack per class. The syntax
for intermediate machine programs is presented in
figure 6. The main syntactic construct is that of a
compartment, which is the notion of component at
this level. A compartment combines a class defini-
tion with all the object instances of this class and
with a local stack.
The main difference with respect to the source lan-
guage is that instead of expressions, method bodies
IP , IQ ::= intermediate program
(IDT , ICT ,EDT )
ICT ::= compartment table
[] | {c 7→ IC} :: ICT
IC ::= compartment declaration
{IM1, ... , IMk ;LOT ;LS}
IM ::= method body
Icode
Icode ::= intermediate machine code
[] | Iinstr ; Icode
Iinstr ::= machine instruction
Nop | This | Arg | Ref o | Sel f | Upd f
| Call c m | Ret | Skipn | Skeqn | Drop | Halt
LOT ::= compartment local object table
[] | {o 7→ LO} :: LOT
LO ::= local instance definition
(o1, ... , ol )
LS ::= local stack
[] | o :: LS
Figure 6: Intermediate language syntax
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are expressed as sequences of instructions in abstract
machine code. These instructions manipulate values
stored on the local stack associated with each com-
partment.
Nop does nothing. This, Arg and Ref o put an
object on the local stack — the current object for
This, the current method argument for Arg, and
object o for Ref o. Sel f pops an object from the
stack, selects field f of this object and pushes the se-
lected value back to the stack. Upd f pops a value
and an object, sets the f field of the object to the
popped value, then pushes back this value on the
stack. Call c m pops an argument value and a target
object o, performs a call of the object o’s m method
with the popped argument if o has type c (otherwise,
the machine failstops). The callee can then use the
Ret instruction to give control back to the caller: this
instruction pops a value from the callee’s stack and
pushes it on the caller’s stack, as a result value for the
call. Skipn skips the n next instructions. Skeqn
pops two values from the local stack and either skips
the n next instructions if the values are equal, or does
nothing more if they are different. Drop removes the
top value from the stack. Halt halts the machine
immediately, the result of the computation being the
current top value on the stack.
The purpose of this intermediate language is to
ease going low-level. In particular, its syntax with the
Call instruction being annotated with a class makes
explicit the fact that method calls are statically re-
solved by the source to intermediate compiler. This
is possible in our source language, because we have
no inheritance.
5.3 Target Level: An Extended Symbolic
Micro-Policy Machine
Here, we present our the target of our compiler: an
extended symbolic micro-policy machine with seg-
mented memory. We first recall the common basis
for our machine and the symbolic machine presented
in the original micro-policies paper [9], then present
and comment on the differences between them.
5.3.1 Symbolic Micro-Policy Machine
A symbolic micro-policy machine [9] is an executable
model of micro-policies that abstracts away from
some of the implementation details (e.g. the im-
plementation of the micro-policy monitor in machine
code). The definition of a symbolic micro-policy ma-
chine is abstracted over a symbolic micro-policy.
mem ::= memory
[] | {loc 7→ R} :: mem
loc ::= region symbolic location
objl o | methl c m | stackl c
R ::= tagged memory region
[] | (word @ tmem) :: R
word ::= symbolic machine word
n | loc + n | encode instr
instr ::= machine instruction
Nop | Const i rd | Mov rs rd | Binopopr1r2rd
| Load rp rd | Store rp rs | Jump r | Jal r | Bnz r i
| Halt
i ::= immediate value
n | loc + n
Figure 7: Symbolic machine memory
LP , LQ ::= low-level program
(IDT ,LPmem,EDT )
LPmem ::= program memory
[] | {loc 7→ LPR} :: LPmem
LPR ::= program memory region
[] | word :: LPR
i ::= immediate value
n | loc + n
Figure 8: Symbolic machine program syntax
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In our case, a symbolic micro-policy is defined as
a collection of symbolic tags, which are used to label
instructions and data, and a transfer function, which
is invoked on each step of the machine to propagate
tags from the current machine state to the next one.
We ignore monitor services of Azevedo de Amorim et
al. [9] and extra pieces of state which are only used
by monitor services — because we don’t need them:
we successfully avoid monitor services, which in the
context of micro-policies are much more expensive
than rules. The transfer function is a mathematical
function that defines the micro-policy rules — in the
mechanized metatheory of the original micro-policies
paper this function is written in Gallina, the purely-
functional language at the heart of the Coq proof
assistant.
A machine state of our symbolic micro-policy ma-
chine is composed of a memory, a register file of
general-purpose registers, and a program counter reg-
ister pc. The program counter register points to a lo-
cation in memory which contains the next instruction
to execute.
We present the list of instructions in figure 7,
together with other memory-related definitions on
which we will focus when we later explain the seg-
mented memory. These instructions are those of the
machine code of the original micro-policies paper [9]:
Nop does nothing. Const i rd puts an immediate
constant i into register rd. Mov rs rd copies the con-
tents of rs into rd. Binopopr1r2rd performs a bi-
nary operation op (e.g. addition, subtraction, equal-
ity test) on the content of registers r1 and r2, and
puts the result in register rd. Load rp rs copies the
content of the memory cell at the memory location
stored in rp to rs. Store rp rs copies the content of rs
to the memory cell at the memory location stored in
rp. Jump and Jal (jump-and-link) are unconditional
indirect jumps, while Bnz r i branches to a fixed off-
set imm (relative to the current pc) if register r is
nonzero. Halt halts the machine immediately.
In the following, we denote Binop+r1r2rd (addi-
tion) by Add r1 r2 rd, and Binop−r1r2rd (subtrac-
tion) by Sub r1 r2 rd.
5.3.2 Extensions to Monitoring Mechanism
We consider a more powerful symbolic micro-policy
machine that allows the transfer function to inspect
and update more tags.
First, we assume that the transfer function pro-
duces new tags for the input arguments of the instruc-
tions; not only for the output one. This is required,
for instance, to transfer a linear capability from an
input to an output: one wants not only to copy the
capability in the output tag, but also to erase it from
the input tag.
Second, we assume that there are some fixed regis-
ters whose tags can always be checked and updated
by the transfer function, even if the registers are nei-
ther input nor output to the current instruction. This
allows us to efficiently clean these fixed registers upon
calls and returns.
Third, we assume that the transfer function re-
ceives as an argument not only the tag of the current
instruction, but also the tag on the next instruction.
For instance, when monitoring a Jump instruction,
we assume the tag on the targeted location can be
checked. This extension allows us to write and ex-
plain our micro-policy in a much simpler way.
The first two extensions require extra hardware
support. For the last extension, however, we con-
jecture that our micro-policy — and probably other
similar micro-policies — can be transformed into a
policy which doesn’t have to perform next instruc-
tion checks. This kind of translation has already been
done by hand, for example in a previous compart-
mentalization micro-policy [9]: the next instruction
checks are replaced by current instruction checks hap-
pening on the next step, making the machine failstop
one step later in the case of an error. We leave for fu-
ture work the writing of a policy compiler doing such
a transformation automatically.
5.3.3 Easing Component-Oriented Reason-
ing: Segmented Memory
Instead of having a monolithic word-addressed mem-
ory, the machine we consider has a segmented mem-
ory which consists of several memory regions which
are addressed by symbolic locations. Targeting such
a machine allows for easy separate compilation, and
is a pragmatic intermediate step when going towards
real machine code, which we plan to do in the future.
As presented in figure 7, the definition of memory
directly mentions symbolic locations. A generic sym-
bolic machine definition would be abstracted over the
definition of symbolic locations, but in our case, we
define them to be either method, object, or stack lo-
cations for reasons that will be clear when we present
our compiler in section 6.1.2. Our instantiation of
memory tags tmem will be studied with other defi-
nitions related to the symbolic micro-policy, in sec-
tion 6.2.
Immediate constants and words in the symbolic
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machine are extended to include symbolic locations
with an offset, which are memory addresses: The k
memory cells of a region located at loc are addressed
from loc+0 to loc+(k − 1). In the following, we use
the simpler notation loc for loc + 0.
Words are also extended to include a new
encode instr construct: Decoding instructions in
this machine is a symbolic operation of deconstruct-
ing such a word. Now that instructions feature sym-
bolic locations with an offset as immediate values, it
would indeed have no practical meaning to try to ex-
tend the encoding of instructions to this. When we
use the PUMP in future work, some of the symbolic-
level instructions could have to be compiled to se-
quences of PUMP instructions: PUMP memory ad-
dresses, the PUMP equivalent of symbolic locations
with an offset, are word-sized and thus too big to fit
in a PUMP immediate value. Another solution would
be to restrict addressable memory to less than a full
word; the symbolic encoding allows us to delay the
choice between these solutions.
Tags are not affected by all the changes that we
listed, hence the monitoring mechanism isn’t affected
either. The semantics, however, is affected in the fol-
lowing way: Trying to decode an instruction out of a
regular word or of a symbolic location with an offset
failstops the machine. All instructions failstop when
one of their operands has the form encode instr . A
Jump, Jal, Load or Store instruction used with a
regular word for the pointer failstops the machine.
These instructions keep their usual behavior when
provided with a symbolic location and a valid offset;
if it does not correspond to a valid memory address,
however, the machine failstops. Most binary opera-
tions failstop when the first or second operand is a
symbolic location with an offset: exceptions are 1)
addition and subtraction with regular words, when
the first operand is the location with an offset, which
respectively increment and decrement the offset ac-
cordingly; 2) equality tests between symbolic loca-
tions with offsets. Finally, the Bnz instruction fail-
stops when the provided register or immediate value
is a symbolic location with an offset.
The syntax for symbolic machine programs is pre-
sented in figure 8. They define a memory which is like
the one of the symbolic machine, except that cells are
not tagged: The tags for the memory will be provided
by the low-level loader, which will be detailed in the
next section.
6 Our Solution: Protecting Com-
piled Code with a Micro-Policy
In this section, we present our solution for the se-
cure compilation of mutually distrustful components:
first we describe our simple two-step compiler, then
we present our micro-policy dynamically protecting
components from each other.
6.1 Two-Step Compilation
We start with our two-step compilation: first the
compilation of source programs to intermediate ma-
chine programs, then the one of intermediate machine
programs to target machine programs.
6.1.1 From Source to Intermediate
Our type-preserving source to intermediate compiler
is a mostly direct translation of source expressions to
abstract machine instructions, which gives a lower-
level view on source components. Nothing in the
translation is related to security: we provide secu-
rity at this level by giving appropriate semantics to
intermediate-level instructions, which make them ma-
nipulate local stacks and local object tables rather
than a single global stack and a single object table. In
this translation, we statically resolves method calls,
which is possible because our language doesn’t fea-
ture inheritance.
A high-level component is easily mapped to an in-
termediate compartment: Method bodies are com-
piled one by one to become intermediate-level method
bodies. Object definitions corresponding to that com-
ponent are taken from the global object table OT and
put in the local object table LOT of the compart-
ment. Finally, the stack is initialized to an empty
stack.
Compiling Source Expressions to Stack Ma-
chine Code Assuming that method m of class c
in program P has definition cr(ca){e}, compilation is
defined as follows:
C (P , c,m) = A (e);Ret
The A function is recursively defined as presented
in figure 9; we allow ourselves to refer to P , c and
m in this definition. We denote by P ; c,m ` e : c′
the predicate indicating that expression e has type c′
when typed within methodm of class c from program
P . In the compilation of method calls, we assume a
type inference algorithm which, given P , c and m,
15
A (this) = This
A (arg) = Arg
A (o) = Ref o
A (e.f ) = A (e);Sel f
A (e.f := e ′) = A (e);A (e ′);Upd f
A (e.m ′(e ′)) = A (e);A (e ′);Call c′m ′
where c′ satisfying
P ; c,m ` e : c′
is found by type inference
A (e1 == e2 ? e3 : e4) = A (e1);A (e2);
Skeq (|A (e4)|+ 1);
A (e4);Skip |A (e3)|;
A (e3);
Nop
A (e; e ′) = A (e);Drop;A (e ′)
A (exit e) = A (e);Halt
Figure 9: Compiling source expressions to intermedi-
ate machine code
finds the unique type c′ such that P ; c,m ` e : c′.
We use it to statically resolve method calls by an-
notating intermediate-level call instructions. In this
document, we do not present the type system nor
the type inference algorithm for our source language,
which are standard.
The invariant used by the compilation is that
executing A (e) in the intermediate level will ei-
ther diverge—when evaluating e in the high-level
diverges— or terminate with exactly one extra ob-
ject on the local stack—in which case this object is
exactly the result of evaluating e. In a method body,
this object on top of the stack can then be returned
as the result of the method call, which is why A (e)
is followed by a Ret instruction in the main compi-
lation function C .
With this invariant in mind, the translation is
rather straightforward, which is not surprising since
our abstract stack machine was designed with this
goal in mind. An important point is that we keep
the evaluation order of the source language: left to
right. It matters because of side effects and early
termination being available in our language.
Let us explain the only non-trivial expression to
compile: the object identity test (e1 == e2 ? e3 :
e4), for which we use two branching instructions
Skeq (|A (e4)| + 1) and Skip |A (e3)|. Here, we de-
note by |A (e)| the length of the sequence of in-
structions A (e). With equal objects, executing
Skeq (|A (e4)|+1) will skip the code corresponding to
e4 and the Skip |A (e3)| instruction, hence branching
directly to the code corresponding to e3 to execute it.
With different objects, executing Skeq (|A (e4)|+ 1)
will do nothing and execution will proceed with the
code corresponding to e4, followed by a Skip |A (e3)|
instruction which will unconditionally skip the code
corresponding to e3, hence branching to the Nop in-
struction. The effect of all this is that in the end,
we have executed e1 and e2 in this order, popped the
resulting objects from the stack, and either executed
e3 if they were equal or e4 if they were different: We
execute the appropriate code in both cases.
6.1.2 From Intermediate to Target
We now present our unoptimizing, type-preserving
translation from intermediate-machine compart-
ments to target-level components. Target-level com-
partments are defined as sets of untagged symbolic
machine memory regions. Like in the source to inter-
mediate compilation, the translation itself is rather
standard. The exception is that components cannot
trust other components to follow conventions such as
not messing with a global call stack, or not modify-
ing some registers. As a consequence, components
use local stacks and all relevant registers need to be
(re)initialized when the compiled component takes
control. Other than that, all security is enforced by
means of instruction-level monitoring (§6.2).
Object Compilation Each object o that was as-
signed a definition (o1, ... , ol ) now gets its own region
in target memory. This region is assigned symbolic
location objl o and spans over l memory cells. These
cells are filled with the objl o1, . . . ,objl ol symbolic
locations — which are the addresses of these objects
in memory.
Local Stack Compilation Each local stack also
gets its own memory region, under symbolic location
stackl c where c is the name of the compartment be-
ing compiled. Components will maintain the follow-
ing invariant during computation: The first cell holds
a symbolic pointer to the top of the stack, which is
(stackl c) + l where l is the length of the stack. The
following cells are used for storing actual values on
the stack.
Here, we only care about compiling intermediate-
level components that come from the source to inter-
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mediate compiler. For these components, the initial
stack is always empty. Hence, we just initialize the
first cell to stackl c, and the initial content of extra
cells can be arbitrary constants: their only purpose
is to be available for filling during the computation.
Method Compilation: From Coarse- to Fine-
Grained Instructions A method with index m
gets its own memory region under symbolic loca-
tion methl c m where c is the name of the compart-
ment being compiled. The length of these memory
regions is that of the corresponding compiled code,
which is what they are filled with. The compilation
is a translation of the method bodies, mapping each
intermediate-level instruction to a low-level instruc-
tion sequence.
The compilation uses ten distinct general-purpose
registers. Register ra is automatically filled upon low-
level call instructions Jal — following the semantics
of the machine studied in the original micro-policies
paper [9] — for the callees to get the address to
which they should return. Registers rtgt, rarg and
rret are used for value communication: rtgt stores the
object on which we’re calling a method—the target
object—and rarg the argument for the method, while
rret stores the result of a call on a return. Registers
raux1, raux2, raux3 are used for storing temporary re-
sults. Register rsp holds a pointer to the current top
value of the local stack — we call this register the
stack pointer register. Register rspp always holds a
pointer to a fixed location where the stack pointer
can be stored and restored – this location is the first
cell in the memory region dedicated to the local stack.
Finally, register rone always stores the value 1 so that
this particular value is always easily available.
The compilation of method m of class c with
method body Icode is defined as follows:
C (c,m, Icode) =
Const 1 rone;
(* load stack pointer *)
Const (stackl c) rspp;Load rspp rsp;
(* push return address *)
Add rsp rone rsp;Store rsp ra;A (c, Icode)
where A (c, Icode) is an auxiliary, recursively defined
function having A (c, [] ) = [] as a base case. As
shown in the code snippet, the first instructions ini-
tialize the registers for them to match with the in-
variant we just explained informally.
Compilation is most interesting for calls and re-
turn instructions, which we present in figure 10. We
A (c,Call c′m; Icode) =
(* pop call argument and object *)
Load rsp raux2;Sub rsp rone rsp;Load rsp raux1;
(* push current object and argument *)
Store rsp rtgt;Add rsp rone rsp;Store rsp rarg;
(* save stack pointer *)
Store rspp rsp;
(* set call object and argument *)
Mov raux1 rtgt;Mov raux2 rarg;
(* perform call *)
Const (methl c′m) raux3;Jal raux3;
(* reinitialize environment *)
Const 1 rone;Const (stackl c) rspp;Load rspp rsp;
(* restore current object and argument *)
Load rsp rarg;Sub rsp rone rsp;Load rsp rtgt
(* push call result *)
Store rsp rret;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Ret; Icode) =
(* pop return value *)
Load rsp rret;Sub rsp rone rsp;
(* pop return address *)
Load rsp ra;Sub rsp rone rsp;
(* save stack pointer *)
Store rspp rsp;
(* perform return *)
Jump ra;A (c, Icode)
Figure 10: Compilation of communication-related in-
structions of the intermediate machine
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A (c,This; Icode) = (* push object *)
Add rsp rone rsp;Store rsp rtgt;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Arg; Icode) = (* push argument *)
Add rsp rone rsp;Store rsp rarg;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Ref o; Icode) = (* push object o *)
Const (objl o) raux1;
Add rsp rone rsp;Store rsp raux1;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Drop; Icode) = Sub rsp rone rsp;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Sel f ; Icode) =
Const (f − 1) raux2;
(* pop object to select from *)
Load rsp raux1;Add raux1 raux2 raux1;
(* load and push field value *)
Load raux1 raux1;Store rsp raux1;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Upd f ; Icode) =
Const (f − 1) raux2;
(* pop new field value and object *)
Load rsp raux3;Sub rsp rone rsp;Load rsp raux1;
(* perform update on object *)
Add raux1 raux2 raux1;Store raux1 raux3;
(* push new field value *)
Store rsp raux3;A (c, Icode)
Figure 11: Compilation of stack-related instructions
of the intermediate machine
A (c,Nop; Icode) = Nop;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Halt; Icode) = Halt;A (c, Icode)
A (c,Skip k ; Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk ; Icode) =
Bnz roneL (Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk );
A (c, Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk ; Icode)
A (c,Skeq k ; Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk ; Icode) =
(* pop and compare objects *)
Load rsp raux2;Sub rsp rone rsp;Load rsp raux1;
Sub rsp rone rsp;Binop=raux1raux2raux1;
(* branch according to result *)
Bnz raux1L (Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk );
A (c, Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk ; Icode)
where L (Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk ) is the length of the
sequence of compiled instructions corresponding to
instructions Iinstr1; ... ; Iinstrk , defined as:
L ([] ) = 0
L (Drop; Icode) = L (Nop; Icode) = 1 +L (Icode)
L (Halt; Icode) = L (Skipn; Icode) = 1 +L (Icode)
L (This; Icode) = L (Arg; Icode) = 2 +L (Icode)
L (Ref o; Icode) = 3 +L (Icode)
L (Sel f ; Icode) = 5 +L (Icode)
L (Ret; Icode) = L (Skeqn; Icode) = 6 +L (Icode)
L (Upd f ; Icode) = 7 +L (Icode)
L (Call c′m; Icode) = 18 +L (Icode)
Figure 12: Compilation of control-related instruc-
tions of the intermediate machine
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also present the compilation of stack-manipulating
instructions in figure 11 and that of control-related
instructions in figure 12. In all these figures, inline
comments are provided so that the interested reader
can get a quick understanding of what is happening.
More standard compilers typically use a global call
stack and compile code under the assumption that
other components will not break invariants (such as
rone always holding value 1) nor mess with the call
stack. In our case, however, other components may
be controlled by an attacker, which is incompatible
with such assumptions. As a consequence, we use
local stacks not only for intermediate results, but also
to spill registers rtgt and rarg before performing a call.
After the call, we restore the values of registers rone,
rspp and rsp that could have been overwritten by the
callee, then fill registers rtgt and rarg from the local
stack.
There is a lot of room for improvement in terms of
compiler efficiency; having a code optimization pass
would be very interesting in the future.
6.2 Micro-Policy Protecting Abstractions
Here, we first present the abstractions that our source
language provides with respect to low-level machine
code, and give intuition about how we can protect
them using a micro-policy. Then, we present our ac-
tual micro-policy and explain how it effectively im-
plements this intuition. We end with a description
of the low-level loader, which sets the initial memory
tags for the program.
6.2.1 Enforcing Class Isolation via Compart-
mentalization
Abstraction Because in the source language fields
are private, classes have no way to read or to write
to the data of other classes. Moreover, classes cannot
read or write code, which is fixed. Finally, the only
way to communicate between classes is to perform a
method call.
In machine code, however, Load, Store and
Jump operations can target any address in memory,
including those of other components. This interac-
tion must be restricted to preserve the class isolation
abstraction.
Protection Mechanism To enforce class isola-
tion, memory cells and the program counter get
tagged with a class name, which can be seen as a
color. The code and data belonging to class c get
tagged with color c.
Load and Store instructions are restricted to loca-
tions having the same color as the current instruction.
Moreover, the rules will compare the next instruc-
tion’s compartment to that of the current instruction:
Switching compartments is only allowed for Jump
and Jal; however, we need more protection on these
instructions because switching compartments should
be further restricted: this is what we now present.
6.2.2 Enforcing Method Call Discipline using
Method Entry Points, Linear Return
Capabilities, and Register Cleaning
Abstraction In the source language, callers and
callees obey a strict call discipline: a caller performs
a method call, which leads to the execution of the
method body, and once this execution ends evalua-
tion proceeds with the next operation of the caller.
In machine code, though, the Jal and Jump instruc-
tions can target any address.
Moreover, in the high-level language callers and
callees give no information to each other except for
the arguments and the result of the call. In the low-
level machine, however, registers may carry extra in-
formation about the caller or the callee and their in-
termediate computational results. This suggests a
need for register cleaning upon calls and returns.
Protection Mechanism On our machine, calls
are done via Jal instructions, which store the return
address in the ra register, and returns by executing a
Jump to the value stored in ra. The first goal here
is to ensure that a caller can only performs calls at
method entry points, and that a callee can only re-
turn to the return address it was given in register ra
on the corresponding call.
To this end, we extend the memory tags to allow
tagging a memory location as a method entry point.
Then, we monitor Jal instructions so that they can
only target such locations. This is enough to protect
method calls. For returns, however, the problem is
not that simple. In contrast with calls, for which all
method entry points are equally valid, only one return
address is the good one at any given point in time;
it is the one that was transferred to the callee in the
ra register by the corresponding call. More precisely,
because there can be nested calls, there is exactly one
valid return address for each call depth.
We reflect this by tracking the current call depth in
the PC tag: it starts at zero and we increment it on
Jal instructions and decrement it on Jump instruc-
tions that correspond to returns. With such tracking,
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we can now, upon a Jal instruction, tag register ra
to mark its content as the only valid return address
for the current call depth. It is however crucial to
make sure that when we go back to call depth n,
there isn’t any return capability for call depth n + 1
idling in the system. We do this by enforcing that the
tag on the return address is never duplicated, which
makes it a linear return capability. The return ca-
pability gets created upon Jal, moved from register
to memory upon Store and from memory to register
upon Load, moved between registers uponMov, and
is finally destroyed upon returning via Jump. When
it gets destroyed, we can infer that the capability has
disappeared from the system, since there was always
only one.
Now that our first goal is met, we can think about
the second one: ensuring that compiled components
do not transmit more information upon call and re-
turn than they do within the high-level semantics.
Upon return, the distrusted caller potentially receives
more information than in the high-level: Uncleaned
registers could hold information from the compiled
callee. Upon calls, the distrusted callee similarly re-
ceives information through registers, but has also an
extra information to use: the content of register ra,
which holds the return address. This content leaks
the identity of the compiled caller to the distrusted
callee, while there is no way for a callee to know the
identity of its caller in the high-level. Fortunately, the
content of register ra is already a specifically tagged
value, and we already prevent the use of linear re-
turn capabilities for any other means than returning
through it or moving it around.
Let us now review the general purpose registers
which could leak information about our compiled par-
tial programs. rtgt and rarg could leak the current
object and argument to the distrusted caller upon re-
turn, but this is fine: the caller was the one who set
them before the call, so he already knows them. Upon
call, these registers do not leak information either
since, according to the compilation scheme, they are
already overwritten with call parameters. rret could
leak a previous result value of the compiled caller to
the distrusted callee upon call: it has to be cleaned.
Upon return, however, and according to the compila-
tion scheme, this register is already overwritten with
the return value for the call. raux1, raux2, raux3 could
leak intermediate results of the computation upon re-
turn and have to be cleaned accordingly. Upon call,
however, following the compilation scheme, they are
already overwritten with information that the dis-
trusted callee either will get or already has. rspp could
leak the identity of the compiled caller to the dis-
trusted callee upon call, since it contains a pointer to
the caller’s local stack’s memory region: it has to be
cleaned. In the case of a return however, the identity
of the compiled callee is already known by the dis-
trusted caller so no new information will be leaked.
rsp could leak information about the current state of
the local stack, as well as the identity of the compiled
caller, and should accordingly be cleaned in both call
and return cases. rone will be known by the distrusted
caller or the distrusted callee to always hold value 1,
and thus won’t leak any information. ra is already
protected from being leaked: it is overwritten both
at call and return time. In the case of a call, it is
overwritten upon the execution of the Jal instruc-
tion to hold the new return address. In the case of a
return, according to the compilation scheme, it will
be overwritten before performing the return to hold
the address to which we are returning. This descrip-
tion concerns the current unoptimizing compiler; for
an optimizing compiler the situation would be a lit-
tle different: more information could be leaked, and
accordingly more registers would have to be cleaned.
A first solution would be to have the compiler pro-
duce register reset instructions Const 0 r for every
register r that could leak information, before any ex-
ternal call or return instruction. However, this would
be very expensive. This is one of the reasons why we
have made the following assumption about our tar-
get symbolic micro-policy machine: The tags of some
fixed registers (here, rret, rspp and rsp upon Jal, and
raux1, raux2, raux3 and rsp upon Jump) can be up-
dated in our symbolic micro-policy rules. We are thus
by assumption able to clean the registers that might
leak information, by using a special tag to mark these
registers as cleared when we execute a Jump or a Jal
instruction.
6.2.3 Enforcing Type Safety Dynamically
Abstraction Finally, in the source language callees
and callers expect arguments or return values that are
well-typed with respect to method signatures: We
only consider high-level components that are stati-
cally well-typed and thus have to comply with the
type interface they declare. At the machine code
level, however, compromised components are untyped
and can feed arbitrary machine words to uncompro-
mised ones, without any a priori typing restrictions.
Protection Mechanism We use micro-policy
rules to ensure that method arguments and return
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values always have the type mentioned in type signa-
tures. Fortunately, our type system is simple enough
that we can encode types (which are just class names)
as tags. Hence, we can build upon the call disci-
pline mechanism above and add the expected argu-
ment type to the entry point tag, and the expected
return type to the linear return capability tag.
Our dynamic typing mechanism relies on the loader
to initialize memory tags appropriately. This initial
tagging will be presented in detail after the micro-
policy itself: The main idea is that a register or mem-
ory location holding an object pointer will be tagged
as such, together with the type of the object. This
dynamic type information is moved around with the
value when it is stored, loaded or copied. One key for
making this possible is that the Const (objl o) r in-
structions which put an object reference in a register
are blessed with the type of this object according to
the type declared for o: executing a blessed Const
instruction will put the corresponding type informa-
tion on the target register’s tag.
Remember that we assume that we can check the
next instruction tag in micro-policy rules. With dy-
namic type information available, we can then do
type checking by looking at the tags of registers rtgt
and rarg upon call, and that of register rret upon re-
turn. Upon call, we will compare with type informa-
tion from the next instruction tag, which is the tag
for the method entry point. Upon return, we will
compare with type information from the return ca-
pability’s tag. For these checks to be possible, we
use the following assumption we made about our tar-
get symbolic micro-policy machine: The tags of some
fixed registers (here, rtgt and rarg upon Jal and rret
upon Jump) can be checked in our symbolic micro-
policy rules.
6.2.4 Micro-Policy in Detail
As presented in section 5.3, a symbolic micro-policy is
the combination of a collection of symbolic tags and
a transfer function. We first detail our tag syntax.
Then, we give the rules of our symbolic micro-policy,
which define its transfer function [9]. Finally, we ex-
plain how the loader initially tags program memory
following the program’s export declarations.
Symbolic Micro-Policy Tags Our collection of
symbolic micro-policy tags is presented in figure 13.
The tag on the program counter register is a natu-
ral number n which represents the current call depth.
tpc ::= program counter tag
n
tmem ::= memory tag
(bt , c, et , vt)
treg ::= register tag
vt
bt ::= blessed tag
B c | NB
et ::= entry point tag
EP ca → cr | NEP
vt ::= regular or cleared value tag
rt | ⊥
rt ::= regular value tag
Retn cr | O c |W
Figure 13: Symbolic micro-policy tags syntax
Memory tags (bt , c, et , vt) combine the various in-
formation we need about memory cells: First, a mem-
ory cell belongs to a compartment c. Its bt tag can
be either B c′ for it to be blessed with type c′ —
which means that it is a Const instruction which
puts an object of type c′ in its target register — or
NB when it shouldn’t be blessed. Similarly, its et
tag can be either EP ca → cr when it is the entry
point of a method of type signature ca(cr), or NEP
when it is not. Finally, the vt tag is for the content
of the memory cell, which can be either: a cleared
value, tagged ⊥; a return capability for going back to
call depth n by providing a return value of type cr,
tagged Retn cr; an object pointer of type c′, tagged
O c′; or a regular word, tagged W.
Tags on registers are the same vt tags as the ones
for the content of memory cells: The content of the
register is also tagged as a cleared value, a return
capability, an object pointer, or a regular word.
Micro-Policy Rules Our micro-policy is pre-
sented in figure 14, where we use the meta notation
clear vt for clearing return capabilities: It is equal to
vt , unless vt is a return capability, in which case it is
equal to ⊥.
This micro-policy combines all the informal intu-
ition we previously gave in sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and
6.2.3 into one transfer function. A notable optimiza-
tion is that we use the tag on the next instruction
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Nop : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′)} =⇒ {tpc′ = n}
Const i rd : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′)} =⇒ {tpc′ = n, trd ′ =W}
Const i rd : {tpc = n, tci = (B c′, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′)} =⇒ {tpc′ = n, trd ′ = O c′}
Mov rs rd : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), trs = vt , trd = vt ′}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n, trd ′ = vt , trs ′ = clear vt}
Binopopr1r2rd : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), tr1 =W, tr2 =W}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n, trd ′ =W}
Load rp rd : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), trp =W, tmem = (bt , c, et ′′, vt), trd = vt ′}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n, trd ′ = vt , tmem′ = (bt , c, et ′′, clear vt)}
Store rp rs : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), trp =W, trs = vt , tmem = (bt , c, et ′′, vt ′)}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n, tmem′ = (NB, c, et ′′, vt), trs ′ = clear vt}
Jump r : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), tr =W} =⇒ {tpc′ = n}
Jump r : {tpc = n + 1, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c′, et ′, rt ′), tr = Retn c, trret = O c}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n, tr′ = ⊥, traux1 ′ = ⊥, traux2 ′ = ⊥, traux3 ′ = ⊥, trsp ′ = ⊥} when c 6= c′
Jal r : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), tr =W, tra = vt ′} =⇒ {tpc′ = n, tra ′ =W}
Jal r : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c′,EP c1 → c2, rt ′), tr =W, tra = vt ′, trarg1 = O c, trarg2 = O c1}
=⇒ {tpc′ = n + 1, tra ′ = Retn c2, trret ′ = ⊥, trspp ′ = ⊥, trsp ′ = ⊥} when c 6= c′
Bnz r i : {tpc = n, tci = (NB, c, et ,W), tni = (bt ′, c, et ′, rt ′), tr =W} =⇒ {tpc′ = n}
Figure 14: The rules of our symbolic micro-policy
to distinguish internal from cross-compartment calls
and returns. Indeed, we don’t need to enforce method
call discipline nor to perform type checking on inter-
nal calls and returns. This is a crucial move with re-
spect to both transparency and efficiency: It means
that low-level components don’t have to comply with
the source language’s abstractions for their internal
computations, and moreover this lax monitoring will
result in a lower overhead on execution time for in-
ternal steps, since there will be less cache misses.
Loader Initializing Memory Tags The loader
first performs simple static checks: it must make sure
that (1) no import declaration is left (the program is
complete); (2) there exists a methl c m region for
each method m of each exported class c; (3) there
exists a stackl c region for each exported class c; (4)
there exists an objl o region for each exported object
o; (5) all memory regions have a matching counter-
part in the export declarations.
If all these checks succeed the loader proceeds and
tags all program memory, following the export decla-
rations: Every memory region is tagged uniformly
with the tag of its compartment; which is c for
methl c m and stackl c memory regions, and the ex-
ported type of o for objl o memory regions. The
first memory cell of each method region methl c m
gets tagged as an entry point with the exported type
signature for method m of class c, while all other
memory cells in the program get tagged as not be-
ing entry points. All locations holding an encoded
Const (objl o) r instruction are tagged as blessed
instructions storing a c object pointer in register r
(B c), where c is the exported type of object o. All lo-
cations that hold a symbolic pointer objl o are tagged
as storing a pointer to an object of class c (O c),
where c is the exported type of object o. This ap-
plies to cells in both object and stack memory regions.
The other stack memory cells are tagged as cleared
values ⊥, and all the remaining memory cells as reg-
ular words W.
7 Related Work
7.1 Secure Compilation
Secure compilation has been the topic of many
works [4, 19, 22, 32], but only recently has the prob-
lem of targeting machine code been considered [6,32].
Moreover, all of these works focus on protecting a pro-
gram from its context, rather than protecting mutu-
ally distrustful components like we do.
Abadi and Plotkin [4] formalized address space
layout randomization as a secure implementation
scheme for private locations, with probabilistic guar-
antees: They expressed it as a fully-abstract compila-
tion between a source language featuring public and
private locations, and a lower-level language in which
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memory addresses are natural numbers. Follow-ups
were presented by Jagadeesan et al. [22] and Abadi,
Planul and Plotkin [2,3], with extended programming
languages.
Fournet et al. [19] constructed a fully-abstract com-
piler from a variant of ML [40] to JavaScript. Their
protection scheme protects one generated script from
its context. A key point is that the protected script
must have first-starter privilege: The first script
which gets executed can overwrite objects in the
global namespace, on which other scripts may rely.
Hence, this scheme can’t protect mutually distrustful
components from each other, since only one compo-
nent can be the first to execute.
The closest work to ours is recent [6,31,32] and on-
going [31,34] work by Agten, Patrignani, Piessens, et
al. They target a set of hardware extensions, which
they call protected module architectures [20, 28, 38].
Micro-policies could be used to define a protected
module architecture, but they offer finer-grained pro-
tection: In our work, this finer-grained protection
allows us to manage linear return capabilities and
perform dynamic type-checking. Micro-policies also
allow us to support a stronger attacker model of dy-
namic corruption, by means of a secure compilation
of mutually distrustful components. As we discov-
ered recently [24, 34], Patrignani et al. are currently
trying to extend there previous work to ensure a se-
cure compilation of mutually distrustful components.
Our hope is that this parallel work can lead to inter-
esting comparison and exchange, because the mecha-
nisms we use are different: We believe that exploiting
the full power of micro-policies can provide stronger
guarantees and better performance than using micro-
policies just as an instance of protected module ar-
chitectures.
7.2 Multi-Language Approaches
In contrast with previous fully-abstract compilers
where a single source component gets protected from
its context, we protect linked mutually distrustful
low-level components from each other.
One benefit of this approach is that components
need not share a common source language. While
our current protection mechanism is still deeply con-
nected to our source language, in principle each com-
ponent could have been written in a specific source
language and compiled using a specific compiler.
It is actually common in real-life that the final pro-
gram comes from a mix of components that were all
written in different languages. Giving semantics to
multi-language programs and building verified com-
pilers that can provide guarantees for them is a hot
topic, studied in particular by Ahmed et al. [7, 35]
and Ramananandro et al. [36].
8 Discussion and Future Work
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our work
and the generality of our approach, as well as future
work.
8.1 Finite Memory and Full Abstraction
While memory is infinite in our high-level language,
memory is finite in any target low-level machine. Our
symbolic micro-policy machine is no exception: mem-
ory regions have a fixed finite size. This means that
memory exhaustion or exposing the size of regions
can break full abstraction.
Let us first recall how memory regions are used in
this work. Our compiler translates method bodies
from high-level expressions to machine code: Each
method gets a dedicated memory region in the pro-
cess, to store its compiled code. This code manipu-
lates a stack that is local to the method’s compart-
ment; and this stack also gets its own memory region.
Finally, each object gets a dedicated memory region,
storing low-level values for its fields.
The first problem is potential exhaustion of the lo-
cal stack’s memory: When the stack is full and the
program tries to put a new value on top, the machine
will stop. This already breaks compiler correctness:
Executing the compiled code for (this; o) will for ex-
ample first try to put rtgt on top on the full stack
and hence stop the machine, when the high-level ex-
pression would simply return o to the caller. Full
abstraction, which typically relies on a compiler cor-
rectness lemma, is broken as well: The low-level at-
tacker can now distinguish between method bodies
(this; o) and o, even though they have the same be-
havior in the high-level. One workaround would be
to add one more intermediate step in the compila-
tion chain, where the symbolic machine would have
infinite memory regions: Full abstraction would be
preserved with respect to this machine, and weak-
ened when we move to finite memory regions. This
workaround is the one taken by CompCert [27], which
until very recently [30] only formalized and proved
something about infinite memory models. A bet-
ter but probably more difficult to implement solution
would be to keep the current finite-memory machine,
but make it explicitly in the property (e.g. compiler
23
correctness, full abstraction) that in cases such as re-
source exhaustion all bets are off.
The second problem is that the size of compiled
method bodies, as well as the number of private fields
of compiled objects, exactly match the size of their
dedicated memory regions. This does not cause prob-
lems with the current memory model in which region
locations exist in isolation of other regions. In future
work, switching to a more concrete view of memory
could lead to the exposure of information to the at-
tacker: If a program region happens to be surrounded
by attacker memory regions, then the attacker could
infer the size of the program region and hence get size
information about a method body or an object. Be-
cause there is no similar information available in the
high-level, this will likely break full abstraction. The
concrete loader could mitigate this problem, for ex-
ample by padding memory regions so that all imple-
mentations of the same component interface get the
same size for each dedicated memory region. This
would be, however, wasteful in practice. Alterna-
tively, we could weaken the property to allow leaking
this information. For instance we could weaken full
abstraction to say that one can only replace a com-
partment with an equivalent one that has the same
sizes when compiled. This would weaken the property
quite a lot, but it would not waste memory. There
could also be interesting compromises in terms of se-
curity vs practicality, in which we pad to fixed size
blocks and we only leak the number of blocks.
These problems are not specific to our compiler.
Fournet et al. [19] target JavaScript and view stack
and heap memory exhaustion as a side channel of con-
crete JavaScript implementations: It is not modeled
by the semantics they give to JavaScript. Similarly,
the key to the full abstraction result of Patrignani et
al. [32, 33] (the soundness and completeness of their
trace semantics) is given under the assumption that
there is no overflow of the program’s stack [33]. Pa-
trignani et al. [32] also pad the protected program so
that for all implementations to use the same amount
of memory.
8.2 Efficiency and Transparency
Our micro-policy constrains low-level programs so as
to prevent them from taking potentially harmful ac-
tions. However, we should make sure 1) that this
monitoring has reasonable impact on the performance
of these programs; and 2) that these programs are not
constrained too much, in particular that benign low-
level components are not prevented from interacting
with compiled components.
A first, good step in this direction is that we
don’t enforce method call discipline nor type safety
on internal calls and returns, but only on cross-
compartment calls and returns. This is a good
idea for both efficiency and transparency: Checks
are lighter, leading to better caching and thus bet-
ter performance; and low-level programs are less
constrained, while still being prevented from taking
harmful actions.
However, the constraints we set may still be too re-
strictive: For example, we enforce an object-oriented
view on function calls and on data, we limit the num-
ber of arguments a function can pass through regis-
ters, and we force the programs to comply with our
type system. This suggests the need for wrappers.
Since internal calls and returns are not heavily mon-
itored, we can define methods that respect our con-
straints and internally call the non-compliant benign
low-level code: This low-level code can then take its
non-harmful, internal actions without constraints —
hence with good performance — until it internally
returns to the wrapper, which will appropriately con-
vert the result of the call before returning to its caller.
8.3 Future Work
The first crucial next step is to finish the full ab-
straction proof. As we explain in section 2, however,
full abstraction does not capture the exact notion
of secure compilation we claim to provide. We will
thus formalize a suitable characterization and prove
it, hopefully reusing lemmas from the full abstraction
proof. Afterwards, we will implement the compiler
and conduct experiments that could confirm or deny
our hopes regarding efficiency and transparency.
There are several ways to extend this work. The
most obvious would be to support more features that
are common in object-oriented languages, such as
dynamic allocation, inheritance, packages or excep-
tions. Another way would be to move to functional
languages, which provide different, interesting chal-
lenges. Taking as source language a lambda-calculus
with references and simple modules, would be a first
step in this direction, before moving to larger ML
subsets.
Finally, the micro-policy use in this work was built
progressively, out of distinct micro-policies which
we designed somewhat independently. Composing
micro-policies in a systematic and correct way, with-
out breaking the guarantees of any of the composed
policies, is still an open problem that would be very
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interesting to study on its own.
8.4 Scaling to Real-World Languages
Our micro-policy seems to scale up easily to more
complicated languages, except for dynamic type
checking which will be trickier.
Sub-typing, which arises with inheritance, would
bring the first new challenges in this respect. Our
dynamic type checking mechanism moreover requires
encoding types in tags: When we move to languages
with richer type systems, we will have to explore in
more detail the whole field of research on dynamic
type and contract checking [18].
Compartmentalization could easily be extended to
deal with public fields, by distinguishing memory lo-
cations that hold public field values from other loca-
tions.
Dynamic allocation seems possible and would be
handled by monitor services, setting appropriate tags
on the allocated memory region. However, such tag
initialization is expensive for large memory regions
in the current state of the PUMP, and could benefit
from additional hardware acceleration [44].
Finally, functional languages bring interesting chal-
lenges that have little to do with the work presented
in this document, such as closure protection and poly-
morphism. We plan to study these languages and
discover how micro-policies can help in securely com-
piling them.
A Appendix
A.1 Encoding Usual Types
export obj decl tt : Unit
export class decl tt { }
obj tt : Unit { }
class Unit { }
Figure 15: Encoding the unit type
Here we give a flavor of what programming looks
like with our source language by encoding some famil-
iar types using our class mechanism: the unit type in
figure 15, booleans in figure 16, and bounded natural
numbers in figure 17. Encoding unbounded natural
numbers would be possible with dynamic allocation,
which is not part of our source language at the mo-
ment.
For better understanding, we use a syntax with
strings for names which is easily mapped to our source
language syntax. We present the three encoded types
as distinct components, resulting in quite verbose
programs: Linking them together in the high-level
would result in one partial program with three classes
and no import declarations.
A.2 Source Semantics
The semantics we propose for the source language is
a small-step continuation-based semantics. It is par-
ticularly interesting to present this variant because
it is very close to our intermediate machine and can
help understanding how the source to intermediate
compilation works.
After loading, source programs become a pair of a
class table CT and an initial configuration Cfg . The
syntax for configurations is presented on figure 18.
A configuration (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e) can be
thought of as a machine state: OT is the object ta-
ble, from which we fetch field values and which gets
updated when we perform field updates. CS is the
call stack, on top of which we store the current en-
vironment upon call. ot is the current object and oa
the current argument. e is the current expression to
execute and K the current continuation, which de-
fines what we should do with the result of evaluating
e.
Configurations can be reduced: The rules for the
reduction CT ` Cfg −→ Cfg ′ are detailed in fig-
ure 19. The class table CT is on the left of the
turnstile because it does not change throughout the
computation.
The initial configuration (OT , [] , ot, oa, [] , e)
features the program’s object table OT , an empty
call stack, and an empty continuation. The cur-
rent expression to execute, e, is the body of
the main method of the program, executing with
appropriately-typed current object ot and argument
oa. Since object and class names are natural numbers,
an example choice which we take in our formal study
is to say that the main method is method 0 of class
0, and that it should initially be called with object 0
of type 0 as both current object and argument.
Our reduction is deterministic. A program ter-
minates with result or when there is a possibly
empty reduction sequence from its initial configura-
tion to a final configuration (OT ′, [] , ot, oa, [] , or)
or (OT ′,CS , ot, oa, (exit) :: K , or). The type sys-
tem ensures that everywhere a exit e expression is
encountered, expression e has the same type as the
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expected return type for the main method. Hence,
when a program terminates with a value, the value
necessarily has this particular type.
import obj decl tt : Unit
import class decl Unit { }
export obj decl t, f : Bool
export class decl Bool {
Bool not(Unit),
Bool and(Bool),
Bool or(Bool)
}
obj t : Bool { }
obj f : Bool { }
class Bool {
Bool not(Unit) { this == t ? f : t }
Bool and(Bool) { this == t ? arg : f }
Bool or(Bool) { this == t ? t : arg }
}
Figure 16: Encoding booleans
export obj decl zero, one, two, three : BNat4
export class decl BNat4 {
BNat4 add(BNat4),
BNat4 mul(BNat4 arg)
}
obj zero : BNat4 { zero, one }
obj one : BNat4 { zero, two }
obj two : BNat4 { one, three }
obj three : BNat4 { two, three }
class BNat4 {
BNat4 pred, succ;
BNat4 add(BNat4) {
arg == zero ?
this : this.succ.add(arg.pred)
}
BNat4 mul(BNat4) {
arg == zero ?
zero : this.mul(arg.pred).add(this)
}
}
Figure 17: Encoding bounded natural numbers
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Cfg ::= reduction configurations
(OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e)
CS ::= call stack
[] | (ot, oa,K ) :: CS
K ::= continuations
[] | E :: K
E ::= flat evaluation contexts
.f | .f := e ′ | o.f :=  | .m(e ′) | o.m()
|  == e ′ ? e ′′ : e ′′′ | o ==  ? e ′′ : e ′′′ | ; e
| exit
Figure 18: Configuration syntax for the source lan-
guage
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CT ` Cfg −→ Cfg ′
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , this) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , ot) this
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K ,arg) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , oa) arg
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e.f ) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,.f :: K , e) sel_push
OT (ot) = obj ct{ot1, ... , otk}
OT (o) = obj ct{o1, ... , ol}
1 ≤ f ≤ l
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,.f :: K , o) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , of ) sel_pop
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e.f := e ′) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (.f := e ′) :: K , e) upd_push
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (.f := e) :: K , o) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (o.f := ) :: K , e) upd_switch
OT (ot) = obj ct{ot1, ... , otk}
OT (o) = obj ct{o1, ... , of−1 , of , o ′j , ... , o′l}
OT ′ = OT [o 7→ obj c{o1, ... , of−1 , o′′, o ′j , ... , o′l}]
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (o.f := ) :: K , o′′) −→ (OT ′,CS , ot, oa,K , o ′′) upd_pop
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e.m(e ′)) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,.m(e ′) :: K , e) call_push
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,.m(e) :: K , o) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, o.m() :: K , e) call_switch
OT (ot
′) = obj ct′{ot′1, ... , ot′k}
CT (ct
′) = class {c1, ... , ci ;M1, ... ,Mj }
1 ≤ m ≤ j
Mm = cr(ca){e}
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, ot′.m() :: K , oa′) −→ (OT , (ot, oa,K ) :: CS , ot′, oa′,K , e) call_pop
CT ` (OT , (ot′, oa′,K ) :: CS , ot, oa, [] , or) −→ (OT ,CS , ot′, oa′,K , or) return
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e1 == e2 ? e3 : e4) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, ( == e2 ? e3 : e4) :: K , e1) test_push
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, ( == e2 ? e3 : e4) :: K , o1) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (o1 ==  ? e3 : e4) :: K , e2) test_switch
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (o1 ==  ? e3 : e4) :: K , o1) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e3) test_pop_eq
o1 6= o2
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (o1 ==  ? e3 : e4) :: K , o2) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e4) test_pop_neq
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , (e; e ′)) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (; e ′) :: K , e) seq_push
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (; e) :: K , o) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , e) seq_pop
CT ` (OT ,CS , ot, oa,K , exit e) −→ (OT ,CS , ot, oa, (exit) :: K , e) exit_push
Figure 19: Continuation-based semantics for the source language
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